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ABSTRACT

Decisions by governments involving the funding and application of science
and technology are increasing in complexity Paradoxically, there is an increasing
demand for greater public participation in these decisions. There are a number of
reasons for this: the recognition that science and technology can have
far-reaching implications and consequences and may involve considerable risks,
high costs, and ethical, moral and environmental considerations. Furthermore,
there has been a growing distrust, or at least a questioning, of the authority and
neutrality of science and the credibility and trustworthiness of scientific
institutions. The establishment of the Australian Animal Health Laboratory with its
long, and at times highly controversial history, reflects these changing attitudes
towards science and technology, and scientists and scientific institutions
The idea of establishing a laboratory for the diagnosis of exotic animal
diseases arose in veterinary circles around 1960 Part One of this thesis traces the
development of this idea, into a proposal to construct a maximum security animal
health laboratory for diagnosis, research, training, and vaccine production and
testing, to be administered by CSIRO,

The control of the laboratory and the

functions it was to perform became the subject of bureaucratic competition and
territorialism, and the process of negotiation, bargaining and con.sensus formation
continued until 1974 when the Parliamentary Public Works Committee Inquiry ^as
held.

This detailed account of the

decision-making processes within the

bureaucracy reveals the political, non-scientific basis for many of the argumenis
and decisions.
By way of contrast. Part Two looks at the public arguments presented to the

I T T

PWC justifying the need for the laboratory and the need for it to perform the
various functions. The structure and procedures of the PWC limited participation,
and the proceedings were dominated by the proponents of the scheme.
Furthermore, the underlying assumption of the rational model of decision-making
required that rational, scientific arguments be constructed to justify the proposal,
with no suggestion of the uncertainties, value-judgements and political factors
involved in the process
Part Three examines the public controversy which erupted over the decision
to import live Foot-and-Mouth Disease virus into the laboratory in advance of an
outbreak. As the debate continued and the scientific basis of the decision to import
the virus was called into question, doubts were raised about the need for the
laboratory. These doubts, fuelled by opposing expert views, eventually called into
question the decision-making process and the role of scientists and scientific
institutions

in

decision-making

and

their

authority

credibility

and

trustworthiness
Although not the initiators of the idea to establish the laboratory CSIRO
played an important role in the decision-making process

Once the strategic

decision to establish this laboratory was taken, the issues were defined as ones
requiring expert scientific consideration, and CSIRO was seen as having the
necessary expertise This was accepted unquestioningly by ihe PWC However
during

the

course of the

pubtic debate, assumptions,

value-judgements,

uncertainties, and political motives underlying the decisions were exposed, and as a
result, the authority, and credibility of CSIRO was undermined. The government's
decision to ban the importation of iive FMD virus for at least five years against the
recommendation of CSIRO, while defusing some of the conflict, further undermined
CSIRO's authority. And it was not until the issue had been re-defmed as one for
expert scientific consideration, with the formation of the fcnner Committee
inquiry, that some of this lost authority was regained.

IV

This study documents the consensus and conflict, the negotiation and
confrontation, and the post-hoc reconstruction of arguments, and reveals the
complex and continual interplay between science and politics in the shaping of a
major public decision.
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PREFACE

The decision to establish the Australian Animal Health Laboratory cannot be
identified as a single decision taken at a particular time by a particular individual
or group. Instead, its establishment was the product of many years of discussion
and negotiation by a variety of actors representing several organisations and
groups. The following study traces in detail this decision-making process. But
while due attention is paid to all the actors involved, the main focus falls on CSIRO.
There are several reasons for this: first, although the initiative to establish a
maximum security animal health laboratory did not originate from CSIRO, the role
played by CSIRO in the decision-making process became increasingly important.
Second, CSIRO was at the centre of the controversy over the decision to import live
FMD virus. Third, it was my intention to examine the way scientists and scientific
institutions behave when involved in political decision-making.
The task of detailing the activities of CSIRO and its individual scientists was
made much easier because of its administrative organisation. CSIRO is made up of a
number of Divisions, each with its own Chief. Each Chief communicates with the
CSIRO Executive through a designated Executive member.

Because the various

laboratories are scattered throughout the country, much of this communication
occurs by letter, and this provides valuable documentation. In contrast to this,
government departments, such as the Department of Health and the Department of
Primary Industry, which are centred in Canberra, leave little trace of the informal
negotiating which occurs in corridors and over lunches. Furthermore, although
each of these organisations has a single Head, the active involvement of the CSIRO
Executive in decision-making provides an excellent source of information through
Executive meeting minutes.

I first became interested in the Australian Animal Health
Laboratory around the middle of 1983, (when Barry Jones and the ASTEC Report
began to catch the public's attention), and used it as a case study for the thesis
component of my M.A. degree. This earlier minor thesis provided a basis and
launching point for my PhD. thesis. However, whilst the subject of both theses is
the same, the PhD. thesis differs from the M.A. thesis in the following respects:
a) The M.A. thesis draws

only on publicly available data,

whereas the PhD. thesis uses a much wider range of archival sources and
interviews, (see Bibliographical essay p.354.)
b) The PhD, thesis provides a much more comprehensive
historical account; it extends further backward to examine the origins of the idea
to establish the laboratory, and further forwards to the public controversy and its
resolution.
c) The major focus of the M.A. thesis was on the PWC Inquiry:
the PhD. thesis provides a new analysis of the PWC Inquiry, apart from the
section on the cost-benefit analysis, the source of which is acknowledged.
d) The PhD. thesis provides a much richer, multi-level analysis
of the involvement of various organisations, groups and individual actors.

1"

Tf you have built castles in the air, your work need not be
lost; that is where they should be. Now put the foundations
under them."
Thoreau.
Quoted by Mr J?.W.Ge«, then Director of the
Bureau of Animal HeaKh, at the Victorian
Veterinary Proceedinos. 1975.

"Whether the money is approved by the Government or
not seems to me to depend much more on the
Government's confidence in the institution putting
forward the plan and its understanding of the status and
merit of those concerned."
Sir Frederick
March 1962.

White, Chairnvan CSIRO,

"I regret this has been a cautionary tale of government
procrastination, political intrigue and scientific
dishonesty , , "
K. A.Ferguson, CSIRO Executive, 'The
Australian Animal Health Laboratory: The
Politics of Science and Agriculture". Annual
CSR Lecture. Sydney University Chemical
Society, November 1983.
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